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TAX LAW-THE 1984 AMENDMENT TO I.RC. § IS2(e): DID CON­
GRESS INTEND TO PREEMPT A STATE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO AL­
LOCATE THE DEPENDENT CHILD EXEMPTION? 
INTRODUCTION 
Internal Revenue Code ("I.RC.") § lS1(c)(1)(B)1 grants an indi­
vidual taxpayer a tax deductible, personal exemption2 for each de­
pendent child. In the case of divorced or legally. separated parents, 
I.RC. § IS2(e)3 provides a "support test" to determine which parent 
is entitled to the dependent child exemption.4 Prior to its amendment 
in 1984,s state courts generally interpreted section IS2(e)6 as providing 
a state court with the authority to allocate the dependency exemption 
to either the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent when decid­
ing family support and child custody matters.7 Indeed, in its prior 
form section IS2(e) expressly permitted state courts, through a decree 
of divorce or separate maintenance, to allocate the exemption to either 
the custodial or the noncustodial parent.8 However, section IS2(e),9 in 
its amended form, contains no specific language that would permit a 
1. I.R.C. § 151(c)(I)(B) (1988). 
2. An "exemption" is defined as "an amount allowed as a deduction from adjusted 
gross income in arriving at taxable income." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 571-72 (6th ed. 
1990). 
3. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). 
4. Id. 
5. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 423(a), 98 Stat. 494, 799-800 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988». 
6. See Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, 81 Stat. 191, amended by Tax Re­
form Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 2139, § 152(e)(2)(B)(i), 90 Stat. 1520, 1932 
(current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988». 
7. In re Marriage of Einhorn, 533 N.E.2d 29, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
8. See Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § 152(e)(2)(A)(i), 81 Stat. 191, 191­
92 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988»; see also Amanda S. Bornhorst, Note, Custo­
dial Parent Dependency Exemptions: Hughes v. Hughes,S AKRON TAX J. 233, 233 (1988) 
(stating that the pre-1984 amendment version of § 152(e) "clearly acknowledged the juris­
diction of state courts to award the [dependency exemption] to the noncustodial parent"). 
9. I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). 
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state court to allocate the dependent child exemption. As a result, 
some state courts have held that they no longer possess the authority 
to allocate the exemption.lO Moreover, because section 152(e) specifi­
cally allocates the exemption to the custodial parent, 1 1 some courts 
have asserted that a state court is now preempted 12 from allocating the 
exemption to noncustodial parents. 13 
Conversely, other state courts have maintained that the changes 
to section 152(e) have not preempted their authority to allocate the 
dependent child exemption. I4 Despite the automatic allocation of the 
exemption to the custodial parent, these courts have asserted that they 
may allocate the exemption to the noncustodial parent by ordering the 
custodial parent to release his or her claim to the exemption. Section 
152(e) provides that a noncustodial parent may claim the dependency 
exemption if the custodial parent releases his or her claim to the ex­
emption. IS However, the statute is silent as to whether a state court 
may order such a release. Consequently, state courts disagree as to 
10. See Holley v. Holley, 547 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Blanchard v. 
Blanchard, 401 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. 1991); Varga v. Varga, 434 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1988); Bennett v. Bennett, 528 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Gleason v. Mich­
litsch, 728 P.2d 965 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Josey v. Josey, 351 S.E.2d 891 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1986); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1989); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548 
(S.D. 1989). 
II. See I.R.C. § 152(e)(I) (1988). 
12. In this context, preemption means that federal law will override state law. See 
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1 (3d ed. 1986). 
13. See Blanchard v. Blanchard, 401 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. 1991); Varga v. Varga, 434 
N.W.2d 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Gleason v. Michlitsch, 728 P.2d 965 (Or. Ct. App. 
1986); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1989); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548 
(S.D. 1989). 
14. See Gamble v. Gamble, 562 So. 2d 1343 (Ala. Ct. App. 1990); Lincoln v. Lin­
coln, 746 P.2d 13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of Beyer, 789 P.2d 468 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1989); Serrano v. Serrano, 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989); Rohr v. Rohr, 800 P.2d 85 
(Idaho 1990); In re Marriage of Rogliano, 555 N.E.2d 1114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re 
Marriage of Baker, 550 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); In re Marriage of Dawson, 467 
N.W.2d 271 (Iowa 1991); In re Marriage of Clingan, No. 62,431, 1989 Kan. App. LEXIS 
206 (Mar. 24, 1989); Hart v. Hart, 774 S.W.2d 455 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Boudreau v. 
Boudreau, 563 So. 2d 1244 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Wassifv. Wassif, 551 A.2d 935 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App.), cert. denied, 556 A.2d 674 (Md. 1989); Bailey v. Bailey, 540 N.E.2d 187 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1989); In re Marriage of Ley, No. C2-90-1121, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS 
906 (Sept. 12, 1990); Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766 (Miss. 1989); Vohsen v. Vohsen, 
801 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); In re Marriage of Milesnick, 765 P.2d 751 (Mont. 
1988); Babka v. Babka, 452 N.W.2d 286 (Neb. 1990); Gwodz v. Gwodz, 560 A.2d 85 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Fleck v. Fleck, 427 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1988); Bobo v. Jewell, 
528 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 1988); Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert. 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); In re Marriage of Peacock, 771 P.2d 767 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1989); Cross V. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1987); Pergolski V. Pergoiski, 420 
N.W.2d 414 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). 
15. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) (1988). 
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whether section 152(e) now preempts a state court from allocating the 
exemption to the noncustodial parent by ordering the custodial parent 
to execute a release of the exemption. 
This Note contrasts two recent cases, Sarver v. Dathe 16 and Ser­
rano v. Serrano,t7 in an attempt to determine whether section 152(e) 
now preempts a state court from allocating the dependent child ex­
emption. Section I sets forth the pre-1984 and post-1984 amendment 
provisions of section 152(e). Section II examines Sarver v. Dathe, 
which held that section 152(e) now preempts a state court's authority 
to allocate the dependent child exemption. Section III examines Ser­
rano v. Serrano, which held that section 152(e), in its amended form, 
does not preempt a state court's authority to allocate the exemption. 
Lastly, Section IV analyzes and contrasts Sarver and Serrano. Section 
IV concludes that Sarver correctly suggests that a state court's alloca­
tion of the dependency exemption does major damage to Congress' 
intention of conferring a tax benefit upon custodial parents. Conse­
quently, section 152(e), as amended, preempts a state court from allo­
cating the dependent child exemption. 
I. 1.R.e. § 152(e) 
1.R.e. § 151(c)(1)(B)IS establishes that a taxpayer may claim as a 
deduction an exemption amount l9 for each dependent child.20 In the 
case of divorced or legally separated parents, I.R.C. § 152(e) provides 
a "support test" to determine which parent is entitled to the dependent 
child exemption.21 The support test seeks to resolve whether the cus­
todial or the noncustodial parent has contributed more than half of the 
support received by the child during the taxable year.22 The parent 
deemed to have contributed that amount is permitted, under I.R.C. 
§ 152(a), to treat the child as his or her dependent. 23 Section 
151(c)(1 )(B) allows this parent to claim an exemption for the 
dependent.24 
16. 439 N.W.2d 548 (S.D. 1989). 
17. 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989). 
18. I.R.C. § 151(c)(I)(B) (1988). 
19. See id. § 151(d). 
20. For purposes of § 152(e), a "child" is defined as "an individual who ... is a son, 
stepson, daughter, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer." See id. § 151(c)(3). 
21. Id. § 152(e). 
22. Id. 
23. Section 152(a) defines "dependent" as "[an] individual[] over half of whose sup­
port, for ... the taxable year of the taxpayer ... , [is] received from the taxpayer." Id. 
§ 152(a). 
24. I.R.C. § 151 (1988) provides in pertinent part: 
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A. 	 Dependent Child Exemption Requirements Prior to the 1984 
Amendment to lR.C § 152(e) 
Prior to its amendment in 1984, section IS2(e) permitted the par­
ent who had custody for the greater portion of the year to claim the 
dependency exemption.2s However, there were three exceptions that 
would enable a party other than the custodial parent to claim the ex­
emption.26 The first exception applied where a decree of divorce, a 
(a) Allowance of deductions 
In the case of an individual, the exemptions provided by this section shall be 
allowed as deductions in computing taxable income. 
(c) Additional exemption for dependents 
(1) In general 
An exemption of the exemption amount for each dependent (as defined in 
section IS2)­
(B) who is a child of the taxpayer and who (i) has not attained the age of 
19 at the close of the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer 
begins, or (ii) is a student who has not attained the age of 24 at the close of 
such calendar year. 
Id. 
2S. Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § IS2(e), 81 Stat. 191, 191 (current 
version at I.R.C. § IS2(e) (1988». Section IS2(e) provided in pertinent part: 
(e) SUPPORT TEST IN CASE OF CHILD OF DIVORCED PARENTS, ETC.­
(1) GENERAL RULE.-If­
(A) a child (as defined in section ISI(e)(3» receives over half of his sup­
port during the calendar year from his parents who are divorced or legally 
separated under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, or who are 
separated under a written separation agreement, and 
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of his parents for more 
than one-half of the calendar year, 
such child shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a), as receiving over half of 
his support during the calendar year from the parent having custody for a greater 
portion of the calendar year unless he is treated, under the provisions of para­
graph (2), as having received over half of his support for such year from the other 
parent (referred to in this subsection as the parent not having custody). 
Id. Custodial parent in this context refers to the parent who has physical custody for the 
greater portion of the year. See Nancy 1. Brown, Comment, Domestic Relations Tax Re­
form, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 2S1, 277 (198S). 
26. 	 § IS2(e), 81 Stat. at 191-92. Section IS2(e) provided in pertinent part: 
(2) SPECIAL RULE.-The child of parents described in paragraph (1) shall be 
treated as having received over half of his support during the calendar year 
from the parent not having custody if ­
(A)(i) the decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, or a written 
agreement between the parents applicable to the taxable year beginning in 
such calendar year, provides that the parent not having custody shall be enti­
tled to any deduction allowable under section lSI for such child, and 
(ii) such parent not having custody provides at least $600 for the support 
of such child during the calendar year, or . 
(B)(i) the parent not having custody provides $1,200 or more for the sup­
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decree of separate maintenance, or a written agreement between the 
parents stated that the noncustodial parent would be entitled to claim 
the exemption provided the noncustodial parent contributed at least 
$600 in child support27 for the taxable year.28 The second exception 
allowed the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption if he or she 
contributed $1200 or more in child support for each child during the 
taxable year provided the custodial parent contributed less than that 
amount.29 The third exception applied to multiple-support agree­
ments establishing that someone other than the custodial parent would 
be entitled to the exemption.30 The first and second of these excep­
tions were eliminated by the 1984 amendments to section 152(e). 
port of such child (or if there is more than one such child, $1,200 or more for 
each of such children) for the calen~ year, and 
(ii) the parent having custody of such child does not clearly establish that 
he provided more for the support of such child during the calendar year than 
the parent not having custody. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, amounts expended for the support of a child 
or children shall be treated as received from the parent not having custody to the 
extent that such parent provided amounts for such support. 
(4) EXCEPTION FOR MULTIPLE-SUPPORT AGREEMENT.-The provisions of 
this subsection shall not apply in any case where over half of the support of 
the child is treated as having been received from a taxpayer under the provi­
sions of subsection (c). 
Id. 
27. Problems arose over the difficulty in determining the definition of support. The 
Treasury regulations provided a vague definition of support, which included "food, shelter, 
clothing, medical and dental care, education, and the like." Deborah E. Behr, Comment, 
Tax Planning in Divorce: Both Spouses Benefitfrom the Tax Reform Act of1984,21 WIL­
LAMElTE L. REv. 767, 803 (1985) (quoting Treas. Reg. § l.ls2-1(a)(2)(i) (1984». In addi­
tion, courts generally defined support liberally. This led to much litigation over the 
valuation of the support given to the child. Id. at 802·m.. 
28. § Is2(e)(2)(A), 81 Stat. at 191-92. This provision expressly permitted a state 
court, in a divorce or separate maintenance decree, to allocate the dependent child exemp­
tion to the noncustodial parent. See id. However, the current version of § Is2(e) does not 
include language that would permit a state court to allocate the dependency exemption by 
means of a decree of divorce or separation. See I.R.C. § Is2(e) (1988). 
29. § Is2(e)(2)(B), 81 Stat. at 192, amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-455, sec. 2139, § Is2(e)(2)(B)(i), 90 Stat. 1520, 1932. This provision permitted a non­
custodial parent to claim the dependent child exemption if he or she contributed the requi­
site amount toward the support of the child. See id. However, § Is2(e) as amended no 
longer provides language that would permit the noncustodial parent to claim the depen­
dency exemption based on the amount of his or her child support cOntribution. See I.R.C. 
§ Is2(e) (1988). 
30. § 152(e)(4), 81 Stat. at 192. This exception is preserved in the current version of 
§ Is2(e). See I.R.C. § 152(e)(3) (1988). Multiple-support agreements are beyond the scope 
of this Note and, therefore, will not be discussed further. 
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B. 	 Dependent Child Exemption Requirements After the 1984 
Amendment to LR.C § 152(e) 
Section 152(e) was amended by Congress pursuant to the Tax Re­
form Act of 1984.31 In the Committee Report on the Act, the Com­
mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives stated that 
it wished to change the provisions of section 152(e) so that disputes 
regarding the dependent child exemption could be resolved without 
the involvement of the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.").32 
Under the amended version of section 152(e),33 the dependent 
child exemption is specifically allocated to the custodial parent regard­
less of the amount of child support provided by the noncustodial par­
ent. 34 There are, however, three exceptions to this general rule.3s The 
31. Tax Refonn Act of 1984, supra note 5. The provisions of the act became effec­
tive January I, 1985. 
32. 	 The Committee Report, in the section entitled "Reasons for Change," stated: 
The present rules governing the allocations of the dependency exemption are 
often subjective and present difficult problems of proof and substantiation. The 
Internal Revenue Service becomes involved in many disputes between parents 
who both claim the dependency exemption based on providing support over the 
applicable thresholds. The cost to the parties and the Government to resolve 
these disputes is relatively high and the Government generally has little tax reve­
nue at stake in the outcome. The committee wishes to provide more certainty by 
allowing the custodial spouse the exemption unless that spouse waives his or her 
right to claim the exemption. Thus, dependency disputes between parents will be 
resolved without the involvement of the Internal Revenue Service. 
H.R. 	REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1498-99 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1140. 
33. 	 I.R.C. § IS2(e) (1988). 
34. 	 I.R.C. § IS2(e) provides in pertinent part: 
(e) Support test in case of child of divorced parents, etc. 
(I) Custodial parent gets exemption 

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, if ­
(A) a child (as defined in section ISI(c)(3» receives over half of his sup­
port during the calendar year from his parents­
(i) who are divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce 
or separate maintenance, 
(ii) 	 who are separated under a written separation agreement, or 
(iii) who live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the calen­
dar year, and 
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of his parents for more 
than one-half of the calendar year, 
such child shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a), as receiving over 
half of his support during the calendar year from the parent having custody 
for the greater portion of the calendar year (hereinafter in this subsection 
referred to as the 'custodial parent'). 
Id. 
35. I.R.C. § IS2(e)(2)-(4) provides the following exceptions to the general rule that 
the custodial parent is entitled to the dependency exemption: 
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first exception requires that the custodial parent sign a written declara­
tion36 stating that he or she will not claim the dependency exemption. 
(2) Exception where custodial parent releases claim to exemption for the year 
A child of parents described in paragraph (1) shall be treated as having re­
ceived over half of his support during a calendar year from the noncustodial par­
ent if­
(A) the custodial parent signs a written declaration (in such manner and 
form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such custodial par­
ent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in 
such calendar year, and 
(B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to the non­
custodial parent's return for the taxable year beginning during such calendar 
year. 
For purposes of this subsection, the term 'noncustodial parent' means the parent 
who is not the custodial parent. 
(3) Exception for mUltiple-support agreement 
This subsection shall not apply in any case where over half of the support of 
the child is treated as having been received from a taxpayer under the provisions 
of subsection (c). 
(4) Exception for certain pre-1985 instruments 
(A) In general 
A child of parents described in paragraph (1) shall be treated as having 
received over half his support during a calendar year from the noncustodial 
parent if­
(i) a qualified pre-1985 instrument between the parents applicable 
to the taxable year beginning in such calendar year provides that the 
noncustodial parent shall be entitled to any deduction allowable 
under section 151 for such child, and 
(ii) the noncustodial parent provides at least $600 for the support 
of such child during such calendar year. 
For purposes of this subparagraph, amounts expended for the support of a 
child or children shall be treated as received from the noncustodial parent to 
the extent that such parent provided amounts for such support. 
(B) Qualified pre-1985 instrument 
For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'qualified pre-1985 instrument' 
means any decree of divorce or separate maintenance or written agreement­
(i) which is executed before January 1, 1985, 
(ii) which on such date contains the provision described in sub­
paragraph (A)(i), and 
(iii) which is not modified on or after such date in a modification 
which expressly provides that this paragraph shall not apply to such 
decree or agreement. 
Id. 
36. This written declaration will be referred to in this Note as an exemption 
"waiver"; it has been generally referred to as a waiver by courts that have ruled on this 
issue. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Lincoln, 746 P.2d 13, 16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Serrano v. 
Serrano, 566 A.2d 413,414 (Conn. 1989); Hart v. Hart, 774 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1989); McKenzie v. Jahnke, 432 N.W.2d 556, 557 (N.D. 1988); Hughes v. Hughes, 518 
N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ohio), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 846 (1988); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442 
N.W.2d 455, 456 (S.D. 1989); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 551 (S.D. 1989); Cross v. 
Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449,456 (W. Va. 1987). 
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This waiver allows the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption. 37 
The second exception provides that a multiple-support agreement may 
entitle someone other than the custodial parent to claim the exemp­
tion.38 The third exception provides that a qualified pre-1985 instru­
ment may permit the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption. For 
this last exception to apply, the noncustodial parent must also provide 
at least $600 in support of the child during the calendar year.39 
Hence, the amount of child support provided by the noncustodial 
parent is no longer a factor in determining which parent may claim the 
exemption.40 Moreover, unlike pre-1984 section 152(e), section 152(e) 
as amended no longer contains specific language that would permit a 
court to allocate the exemption to the noncustodial parent through a 
decree of divorce or of separate maintenance.41 Section 152(e) now 
allocates the dependent child exemption to the custodial parent unless 
one of the exceptions enumerated in the section applies. Conse­
quently, a state court's allocation of the exemption to a noncustodial 
parent, in the absence of one of the section 152(e)(2)-(4) exceptions, 
would appear to be in direct conflict with the plain language of section 
152(e). 
II. SARVER V. DATHE42 
A. Facts 
In Sarver, the plaintiff and defendant had been divorced pursuant 
to a Judgment and Decree of Divorce issued by the Meade County 
Circuit Court in 1979. Under the decree, the Meade County court 
awarded custody of the sole child of the marriage to the plaintiff 
mother and ordered the defendant father to pay child support.43 
In 1986, the plaintiff sought to modify the child support agree­
ment44 and to secure an increase in the defendant's child support pay­
37. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) (1988). This exception is of primary concern in this Note. 
The remaining exceptions, § 152(e)(3)-(4), are irrelevant to the topic of this Note because 
the cases under review contain no agreements that might invoke those provisions. See id. 
§ 152(e)(3)-(4). 
38. Id. § 152(e)(3). 
39. Id. § 152(e)(4). 
40. See supra note 29. 
41. See supra note 28. 
42. 439 N.W.2d 548 (S.D. 1989). 
43. Id. at 549. 
44. Section 152(e)(4), which provides an exception to the general rule that the custo­
dial parent is entitled to the dependent child exemption, is not applicable to the facts of the 
Sarver case. See I.R.C. § 152(e)(4) (1988). Section 152(e)(4) states that a noncustodial 
parent may claim the dependent child exemption if there exists a pre-1985 divorce decree 
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ments by filing a Petition for Modification of Child Support with the 
Department of Social Services ("DSS"). The DSS granted this peti­
tion and approved a subsequent request by the plaintiff for a further 
increase in the defendant's child support payments.45 The defendant 
responded by filing a motion requesting that the Mead County court 
set aside the latter increase and award him the dependent child exemp­
tion. Subsequently, the court granted the defendant's requests.46 The 
plaintiff's subsequent motion for rehearing by the Meade County 
court was denied, and the plaintiff appealed.47 
B. Holding and Analysis 
The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the circuit court 
erred in allocating the dependent child exemption to the defendant 
noncustodial parent.48 The South Dakota Supreme Court interpreted 
the provisions ofsection 152(e)49 as specifically allocating the depend­
ent child exemption to the custodial parent, subject to three excep­
tions. The court noted that for any of these exceptions to be invoked, 
a written document must exist. This document may be a written dec­
laration that the custodial parent will not claim the exemption, 50 a 
multiple-support agreement that allocates the exemption to someone 
other than the custodial parent,51 or a qualified pre-1985 instrument 
that allocates the exemption to the noncustodial parent. 52 Because no 
such documents existed, the court found that none of the exceptions to 
section 152(e) were applicable. Consequently, the court concluded 
that the custodial parent was entitled to the exemption and that the 
circuit court had erred in allocating the exemption to the noncustodial 
parent.53 
Next, the Sarver court addressed the issue of whether a state 
or written agreement stating that the noncustodial parent would be entitled to the exemp­
tion. Id. In Sarver, the parties' 1979 divorce decree and child support agreement made no 
reference to the dependent child exemption. See Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 551. 
45. Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 549. 
46. Id. at 549-50. The circuit court did not order the plaintiff custodial parent to 
sign a written declaration that she would not claim the dependent child exemption; the 
court merely declared that the defendant noncustodial parent was entitled to the exemp­
tion. Id. at 550-51. 
47. Id. at 550. 
48. Id. at 551. 
49. I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). 
50. See id. § 152(e)(2). 
51. See id. § 152(e)(3). 
52. See id. § 152(e)(4). 
53. Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 551 (S.D. 1989). The South Dakota Supreme 
Court apparently viewed a state court's allocation of the dependency exemption to a non­
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court could order a custodial parent to execute a section 152(e)(2) ex­
emption waiver54 and thereby reallocate the dependent child exemp­
tion to the noncustodial parent. 55 The Sarver court insisted that the 
actions of those state courts which attempted to: 
override federal tax law by ordering custodial parents to execute an 
exemption waiver and thus qualify noncustodial parents under 26 
U.S.C. section 152(e)(2) [amounted to] ... an unconstitutional med­
dling with Congressional authority granted under the Sixteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and, [is] therefore, 
contrary to the Supremacy Clause of the [Constitution].56 
Consequently, the South Dakota Supreme Court asserted that a state 
court lacks the authority to grant the dependent child exemption to a 
noncustodial parent without first obtaining the custodial parent's 
consent.57 
Two justices concurred with the Sarver majority. Justice Mor­
gan, in his concurring opinion, expressed his support for the view that 
custodial parent as being in direct conflict with the express language of § I 52(e). See I.R.C. 
§ 152(e) (1988); see also supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text. 
The Sarver court also cited State v. Dryden, 409 N.W.2d 648 (S.D. 1987), as precedent 
for its holding. In Dryden, the South Dakota Supreme Court noted that the amended 
version of § 152(e) divested state courts of their authority to allocate the dependent child 
exemption. Id. at 652 n.2. 
54. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) (1988). 
55. The facts in Sarver did not compel the Sarver court to address this issue. 
Although the Meade County court awarded the dependent child exemption to the noncus­
todial parent, the court did not implement that decision by ordering the custodial parent to 
execute a § 152(e)(2) exemption waiver. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
However, the South Dakota Supreme Court later confronted this issue in Brandriet v. 
Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1989), which was decided two months after Sarver. In 
Brandriet the court held that a state court may not order a custodial parent to execute a 
§ 152(e)(2) exemption waiver because Congress had contemplated a "voluntary" waiver. 
Id. at 459. 
It should be noted that although Sarver and Brandriet are similar in result, the analy­
ses applied by the South Dakota Supreme Court in the two cases differ. The Brandriet 
decision focuses on the "voluntary" nature of the waiver, while the Sarver decision focuses 
on federal preemption analysis. 
56. Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 551-52 (citations omitted). 
57. Id. at 552. The Sarver court expressed its agreement with the Michigan Court of 
Appeals' assertion in Varga v. Varga, 434 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), that: 
[A] trial court [is] without authority to order that [a noncustodial parent] is enti­
tled to claim the deduction without obtaining [the custodial parent's] consent. 
[A] court could, however, consider which parent had the benefit of the exemption 
under the amended tax statute and its effect on the parties [sic] ability to pay as 
relevant factors in deciding the amount [of child support to be provided by the 
noncustodial parent]. 
Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 552 (citing Varga, 434 N.W.2d at ISS-56). The Sarver court's 
agreement with this assertion suggests its belief that § 152(e), as amended, confers a tax 
benefit upon custodial parents. See infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text. 
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a state court may not allocate the exemption by ordering the custodial 
parent to execute a section 152(e)(2) exemption waiver. 58 Justice Mor­
gan cited as support for this view the Committee Report on the Tax 
Reform Act of 1984, which states: 
For this exception to apply, the custodial parent will have to sign a 
written declaration that he or she will not claim the child as a de­
pendent for the year, and the noncustodial parent will have to at­
tach the written declaration to his or her tax return. That 
declaration may be made for one or more specified calendar years. 
The parties may make a permanent declaration a copy of which the 
noncustodial parent attaches to each year's return, or the declara­
tion may be made by the custodial spouse annually in order to better 
insure the receipt of child support payments. 59 
Justice Morgan emphasized the Ways and Means Committee's state­
ment that the custodial parent had the option of annually executing 
the waiver "in order to better insure the receipt of child support pay­
ments."60 Apparently, Justice Morgan perceived this statement as 
evincing the Ways and Means Committee's desire to enable a custodial 
parent to use the dependent child exemption as an inducement for the 
noncustodial parent to fulfill his or her child support obligation. He 
thought that permitting a state court to order the custodial parent to 
execute the waiver would divest the custodial parent of sole control 
over the waiver and thereby negate the custodial parent's ability to use 
the exemption as an inducement. Therefore, he concluded that Con­
gress did not intend to vest a state court with the power to allocate the 
exemption.61 
Justice Sabers, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the major­
ity's assertion that the trial court could reduce the noncustodial par­
ent's child support obligation by an amount equal to the value of the 
dependent child exemption.62 However, he maintained that "trial 
courts have inherent authority to order the custodial parent to execute 
[a section 152(e)(2) exemption waiver] ... because the tax exemption 
is part of the child support issue. "63 The Connecticut Supreme Court, 
in Serrano v. Serrano,64 took a position similar to this view.65 
58. Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 553 (Morgan, J., concurring specially). 
59. [d. at 553 (quoting the section of the Committee Report entitled "Explanation of 






62. [d. at 554 (Sabers, J., concurring specially). 
63. [d. (citations omitted). 
64. 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989). 
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III. SERRANO V. SERRAN066 
A. Facts 
In Serrano, the trial court dissolved the parties' marriage; ordered 
the plaintiff to pay child support to the defendant, the custodial par­
ent;67 and allocated the dependent child exemption to the plaintiff.68 
To implement its decision and to ensure that its allocation of the ex­
emption to the plaintiff noncustodial parent would not conflict with 
section 152(e), the trial court ordered the defendant custodial parent 
to execute annually a section 152(e)(2) exemption waiver.69 
The defendant asserted that this order was invalid, arguing that 
upon enactment of the 1984 amendments to section 152(e)1° Congress 
had preempted the authority of a state court to allocate the dependent 
child exemption. Moreover, the defendant maintained that Congress, 
in enacting the amendments to section 152(e), intended to confer a tax 
benefit upon the custodial parent. However, Congress intended to 
confer this benefit to the noncustodial parent only if the custodial par­
ent "voluntarily" consented to its transfer. It followed, the defendant 
argued, that the trial court's order conflicted with congressional intent 
and was invalid. 71 
65. See id. at 417-18; see also infra text accompanying note 88. 
66. 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989). 
67. The trial court granted the plaintiff and defendant joint custody of their child. In 
a joint custody arrangement such as this, the defendant, with whom the child was to reside, 
would be considered the custodial parent under § 152(e)(1)(B). See I.R.C. § 152(e)(I)(B) 
(1988). This section refers to the custodial parent as "the parent having custody for a 
greater portion of the calendar year." Id. In this context, custody seems to be equated 
with physical custody. Brown, supra note 25, at 280-81. 
68. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 414. 
69. Id. Compliance with the language of § 152(e) required that the trial court order 
the defendant to execute a § 152(e)(2) exemption waiver. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). Sec­
tion 152(e)(I) specifically allocates the exemption to the custodial parent. Id. § 152(e)(1). 
However, § 152(e)(2) states that if the custodial parent executes an exemption waiver, the 
noncustodial parent may claim the exemption. Id. § 152(e)(2). 
70. Tax Reform Act of 1984, supra note 5. 
71. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 415. The defendant also argued that the trial court's alloca­
tion of the dependent child exemption to the plaintiff was an exercise of its equitable powers 
that could have been avoided. She maintained that the court could have resorted to a less 
intrusive legal remedy, namely, reducing the plaintiff's child support payments by the value 
of the exemption to the plaintiff. Id. at 418. In response, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
noted that "actions for dissolution of marriage are inherently equitable proceedings," and 
that a court's use of its "broad equitable power" is often essential to fashioning a "just 
remedy." Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, the court pointed out that the trial court 
exercised its equitable powers appropriately, considering the facts of the case. The defend­
ant, a welfare recipient, had no income against which to apply the exemption. In addition, 
the state would be reimbursed for the welfare payments to the defendant out of the plain­
tiff's support payments. Consequently, reducing the plaintiff's support payments, instead 
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B. Holding and Analysis 
The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant 
and held that section 152(e), as amended in 1984, does not preempt a 
state court from allocating the dependent child exemption to the non­
custodial parent.72 The court began its analysis by noting that the de­
termination of whether a federal law preempts a state law is a federal 
question arising under the Supremacy Clause73 of the Constitution.74 
Consequently, the court examined United States Supreme Court pre­
cedent to determine whether section 152(e), as amended, preempts a 
state court's authority to allocate the dependency exemption. 
The court relied primarily on Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. 
State Corp. Commission of Kansas 7S for guidance regarding federal 
preemption analysis. Citing Northwest Central, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court stated that, ultimately, it must be determined whether 
Congress has exercised its power under the Supremacy Clause to pre­
empt the state law. 76 Absent explicit language or statements revealing 
Congress' intent to preempt the state law, such intent may be inferred 
where: 
Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of 
regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal 
law, or where the state law at issue conflicts with federal law, either 
because it is impossible to comply with both, or because the state 
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
of granting him the exemption, would have placed a greater burden on the state. Finally, 
the court opined that the trial court's ruling provided "an incentive for the plaintiff to keep 
current in his support payments since the defendant [could] refuse to execute [the exemp­
tion waiver] for any tax year during which the plaintiff has failed to make support pay­
ments." Id. 
72. Id. at 415, 418. 
73. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
74. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 415. 
75. 489 U.S. 493 (1989). In Northwest Central, the Supreme Co!lrt held that the 
Federal Natural Gas Act did not preempt a Kansas law that regulated the production of 
natural gas. Id. at 519-22. The Federal Natural Gas Act provided for federal regulation of 
the cost of natural gas. Id. at 506-07. However, the Kansas law also regulated the cost of 
natural gas by threatening the cimcellation of a natural gas producer's entitlement to as­
signed quantities of gas if "production [were] too long delayed." Id. at 497. The Supreme 
Court held that although the Kansas law indirectly affected the cost of natural gas, it was 
not preempted by the federal act. Id. at 516. The Court found that it was possible to 
comply with both the federal and the state law, that the state statute did not prevent the 
attainment of the goals of the federal act, and that the statute achieved a proper state 
purpose. Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute was not preempted. 
Id. at 516-19. 
76. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 415. 
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congressional objectives.77 
The Connecticut Supreme Court found no explicit congressional 
intention to preempt a state court's authority to allocate the dependent 
child exemption. Neither the legislative history of the amendments to 
section 152(e) nor the post-1984 amendment language of the statute 
revealed any explicit language or statements forbidding a state court 
from allocating the dependency exemption.78 Moreover, the court 
found no congressional intent to regulate the entire field of domestic 
relations.79 
Furthermore, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that it is 
possible for a custodial parent to comply with both section 152(e) and 
a state court order that allocates the dependency exemption by order­
ing the custodial parent to execute a section 152(e)(2) exemption 
waiver. Had this been impossible, a congressional intent to preempt 
state courts' authority to allocate the dependent child exemption could 
have been inferred. 80 
The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that the only disputed 
question was whether the trial court's order stood as an obstacle to the 
objectives sought by Congress in amending section 152(e).81 However, 
the court noted that because the states have traditionally regulated the 
field of domestic relations, "the standard for demonstrating a preempt­
ing conflict between federal law and a state domestic relations provi­
sion is high ...."82 The United States Supreme Court articulated this 
standard in United States v. Yazell,83 where it held that a federal law 
will preempt state family law "only where clear and substantial inter­
77. Id. (citations omitted). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. [d. In contrast, had the trial court simply stated in its order that the noncus­
todial parent may claim the exemption, compliance with both § I 52(e) and the order would 
have been impossible because § I 52(e) specifically allocates the exemption to the custodial 
parent. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). However, this impossibility is removed when a trial 
court rules that the noncustodial parent may claim the exemption and orders the custodial 
parent to execute an exemption waiver. This is so, because § I 52(e)(2) permits the noncus­
todial parent to claim the exemption if the custodial parent executes an exemption waiver. 
See id. § 152( e )(2). 
81. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 415. 
82. Id. 
83. 382 U.S. 341 (1966). In Yazell, the federal government sought to enforce a 
promissory note signed by the defendants husband and wife who received a Small Business 
Administration disaster loan. Upon default, the government attempted to collect the defi­
ciency from the defendant wife's separate property. The Supreme Court held that the fed­
eral government's interest in collecting on a negotiable debt did not override Texas law, 
which provided that "a married woman could not bind her separate property unless she 
had first obtained a court decree removing her disability to contract." Id. at 343. 
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ests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently 
with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the 
state law is applied."84 
The Serrano court therefore asked whether the trial court's rul­
ing, which ordered the custodial parent to execute a section 152(e)(2) 
exemption waiver, inflicted "major damage" upon the federal interests 
that Congress sought to achieve in amending section 152(e). To an­
swer this question the court first attempted to determine the relevant 
federal interest Congress wished to achieve. The defendant argued 
that Congress sought to confer a tax benefit upon the custodial parent 
by specifically allocating the dependent child exemption to the custo­
dial parent. The argument in support of this view is that if Congress 
had intended to allow a state court to transfer this tax benefit to the 
noncustodial parent, Congress would have provided explicit language 
to this effect in the 1984 amendments to section 152(e).8s The defend­
ant also noted that the pre-1984 version of section IS2(e) contained 
language permitting a state court, through a decree of divorce or of 
separate maintenance, to allocate the exemption;86 however, no such 
language exists in the amended version. 87 
The Serrano court, however, rejected the defendant's argument, 
because the argument failed to recognize that state courts had been 
allocating the exemption "for decades," long before the I.R.S. made 
explicit reference to the practice in the first version of section 152(e) in 
1967.88 Instead, the Serrano court asserted that the pertinent federal 
interest was Congress' desire to remove the I.R.S. from "disputes be­
tween parents who both claim the dependency exemption."89 
After identifying the federal interest as Congress' desire to ex­
clude the I.R.S. from disputes pertaining to the dependent child ex­
emption, the Serrano court determined that the trial court's order did 
not do "major damage" to this interest. The Serrano court found no 
major damage because the trial court's order did not conflict with 
84. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). 
85. See Se"ano, 566 A.2d at 416-17. 
86. See Act of Aug. 31,1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § 152(e)(2)(A)(i), 81 Stat. 191, 191­
92 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988». 
87. Se"ano, 566 A.2d at 416-17; see I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). 
88. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 417. 
89. Id. at 417-18 (quoting the section of the Committee Report entitled "Reasons for 
Change," H.R. REP; No. 432, supra note 32, at 1498, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1140). For a discussion concerning the appropriateness of reliance on the "Reasons for 
Change" portion of committee reports when determining congressional intent, see Michael 
Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of 
Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 878-87 (1991). 
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Congress' goal of removing the I.R.S. from these disputes.90 Congress 
achieved this goal by eliminating from section 152(e) the exceptions 
requiring a determination of the amount of child support contributed 
by each parent.91 The trial court's order, effectively allocating the ex­
emption to the noncustodial parent, did not involve the I.R.S., and 
therefore, did not contravene Congress' purpose.92 
In sum, the Serrano court's federal preemption analysis revealed 
no conflict between section 152(e) and the trial court's order. Conse­
quently, the court concluded that section 152(e) does not preempt a 
state court's authority to allocate the dependent child exemption.93 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Sarver court and the Serrano court reached different conclu­
sions concerning whether section 152(e) preempts a state court's au­
thority to allocate the dependent child exemption to the noncustodial 
parent by ordering the custodial parent to execute an exemption 
waiver. The Sarver court's reasoning implicitly suggested that section 
152(e) preempts a state court's authority to order the waiver because 
the order does major damage to Congress' intent to confer a tax bene­
fit upon custodial parents.94 Conversely, the Serrano court argued 
against preemption because the state court order does not affect Con­
gress' intent to remove the I.R.S. from disputes regarding the exemp­
tion.95 Essentially, the Sarver court and the Serrano court disagree on 
what Congress intended to achieve in amending section 152(e). Con­
sequently, a resolution of this issue will determine whether the Sarver 
court's view or the Serrano court's view should prevail.96 ' 
90. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 418. 
91. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text. 
92. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 418. 
93. Id. 
94. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 
238 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citing Sarver as pro­
posing that the dependent child exemption confers a financial benefit in the form of a reduc­
tion in taxable income). 
95. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. 
96. If in amending § 152(e) Congress intended to confer a tax benefit upon custodial 
parents, a state court order that allocates the dependency exemption to the noncustodial 
parent does major damage to this congressional intent. Hence, pursuant to the "major 
damage" preemption standard promulgated by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966), § 152(e) as amended would preempt a state court's au­
thority to make such an allocation. See David J. Benson, The Power of State Courts to 
Award the Federal Dependency Exemption Upon Divorce, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 29, 39 
(1990); James A. Rodenberg, Note, AI/ocating Federal Income Tax Dependency Exemp­
tions in Divorce Decrees, 55 Mo. L. REV. 1075, 1084 (1990); see also supra notes 77-84 and 
accompanying text. If, however, Congress' sole intent was to remove the I.R.S. from dis­
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There are two arguments which support the Sarver court's view 
that the 1984 amendments to section IS2(e) evince a congressional in­
tent to confer a tax benefit upon the custodial parent. The first is that 
Congress specifically allocated the dependent child exemption to the 
custodial parent, and the noncustodial parent can receive the exemp­
tion only if the custodial· parent voluntarily relinquishes his or her 
right to the exemption by executing a section IS2(e)(2) exemption 
waiver.97 The second argument is that, unlike the pre-1984 version of 
section IS2(e), the amended version contains no language authorizing 
a state court to allocate the dependent child exemption.98 
The Sarver court's reasoning follows the voluntary relinquish­
ment argument. The court interpreted the section IS2(e)(2) exemp­
tion waiver as voluntary and concluded that a state court may not 
allocate the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent without 
obtaining the custodial parent's consent.99 The South Dakota 
Supreme Court, in Brandriet v. Larsen, 100 reached a similar result in 
reliance on the Committee Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1984.101 
The Report stated that the custodial parent would have the option of 
executing the section IS2(e)(2) exemption waiver yearly, to ensure that 
the noncustodial parent complies with his or her child support obliga­
tions.102 The Brandriet court interpreted this statement as contem­
plating a voluntary waiver because state court authority to order a 
permanent waiver would divest the custodial parent of his or her op­
tion to execute the waiver yearly.103 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that Congress did not intend 
the section IS2(e)(2) exemption waiver to be executed only voluntar­
ily. Congress made no explicit statement that it intended the exemp­
tion waiver to be only voluntary, and section IS2(e) does not explicitly 
state that the custodial parent must execute the exemption waiver 
voluntarily. 
putes involving the dependency exemption, § 152(e) as amended does not preempt a state 
court from allocating the exemption to the noncustodial parent as the allocation does not 
involve the I.R.S. in such disputes. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
97. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). 
98. See Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § 152(e)(2)(A)(i), 81 Stat. 191,191­
92 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988»; I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). 
99. Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 552 (S.D. 1989). 
100. 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1989). 
101. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 32, at 1499, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1140. 
102. Id.; see also supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
103. Brandriet, 442 N.W.2d at 459. 
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Yet, as Judge Wright, dissenting in Hughes v. Hughes,l04 noted, 
the ordinary usage of the term "release" implies a voluntary relin­
quishment, and it is "[a] fundamental canon of statutory construction 
... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking 
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."lOs Hence, it ap­
pears reasonable to interpret the release as voluntary in nature, and 
consequently, the voluntary relinquishment argument is viable. 
The second argument tending to support the view that Congress 
intended to confer a tax benefit upon the custodial parent is that while 
the amended version of section 152(e) specifically allocates the depen­
dency exemption to the custodial parent, Congress deliberately omit­
ted language that would have enabled a state court to allocate the 
exemption to the noncustodial parent. 106 This deliberate omission ar­
gument gains credibility from the fact that the pre-1984 version of sec­
tion 152(e) contained language that permitted a state court to allocate 
the dependent child exemption.107 
Some state courts, however, have rejected this argument,108 as­
serting that the omission merely "demonstrates Congress'[] surpass­
ing indifference to how the exemption is allocated as long as the IRS 
[does not] have to do the allocating."I09 These courts seem to suggest 
that Congress' failure to explicitly authorize state court allocation of 
the exemption was merely an oversight, and that Congress assumed 
section 152(e), as amended, would continue to be interpreted as per­
mitting such allocation. 
This response fails to consider the relevance of section 152(e)(4), 
which explicitly states that only "pre-1985" divorce decrees allocating 
the dependent child exemption to the noncustodial parent are recog­
nized under the amended version of section 152(e).l10 The provision 
does not attest to Congress' "surpassing indifference"; but rather, it 
demonstrates a deliberate intention by Congress to omit from section 
152(e) language that would recognize post-1985 divorce decrees. The 
104. 518 N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 846 (1988). 
105. Id. at 1216-17 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Perrin V. United States, 444 
U.S. 37, 42 (1979». 
106. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). 
107. See Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § 152(e)(2)(A)(i), 81 Stat. 191, 
191-92 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988». 
108. See, e.g., Wassif V. Wassif, 551 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. de­
nied, 556 A.2d 674 (Md. 1989); Motes V. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
cert. denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Cross V. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449,457 (W. Va. 
1987). 
109. Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 457. 
110. I.R.C. § 152(e)(4) (1988). 
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fact that language allowing state courts to allocate the exemption no 
longer exists thus demonstrates congressional intent to prohibit state 
courts from allocating the exemption. Hence, the Sarver court's view 
that Congress intended to confer a tax benefit upon the custodial par­
ent by amending section 152(e) seems more persuasive than the Ser­
rano court's view. 
CONCLUSION 
State courts may no longer allocate the dependent child exemp­
tion. Prior to its amendment in 1984, section 152(e) contained lan­
guage that permitted a state court to allocate the dependency 
exemption to either the custodial or the noncustodial parent. How­
ever, the amended version of section 152(e) specifically allocates the 
exemption to the custodial parent unless he or she executes a written 
declaration entitling the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption. 
Moreover, the amended statute makes no reference to any state court 
authority to allocate the dependent child exemption. Consequently, 
the language of the statute no longer explicitly permits a state court to 
allocate the dependency exemption. 
Furthermore, a state court may not attempt to reallocate the de­
pendency exemption to the noncustodial parent by ordering the custo­
dial parent to execute a written declaration releasing his or her right to 
the exemption. As the Sarver court's reasoning suggests, the 1984 
amendments to section 152(e) evince a congressional intent to confer a 
tax benefit upon custodial parents. Consequently, because a state 
court's reallocation of the dependency exemption does major damage 
to Congress' intent to confer a tax benefit upon custodial parents, sec­
tion 152(e) must be interpreted to preempt such state court action.11l 
Rodney V. Nutt 
Ill. This conclusion that Congress had a deliberate intent to confer a tax benefit 
upon custodial parents makes it clear that such a congressional intention would be under­
mined by permitting state courts to allocate the exemption to the noncustodial parent. 
Under traditional preemption analysis whenever "clear and substantial interests of the Na­
tional Government ... will suffer major damage if the state law is applied," preemption will 
be found. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). 
